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ABSTRACT 
One of the more intriguing empirical 
findings in recent years is evidence that a 
number of Third World economies experience a 
positive relationship between military 
expenditures and overall rates of economic 
growth. While this result has been found in 
a number of individual studies, no 
satisfactory explanation has been put forth 
-- presumably defense expenditures have both 
positive spin-offs, tending to support 
growth, and a number of negative aspects such 
a crowding out of private sector investment 
which tend to reduce overall growth. It is 
something of a tautology therefore to argue 
that those countries experiencing net 
positive benefits from defense expenditure 
simply have an environment where the net 
positive effects predominate. The purpose of 
this paper is to show that Third World arms 
producers differ considerably in terms of 
budgetary priorities from their non producer 
counterparts. More importantly it can be 
demonstrated that differences in budgetary 
priorities between these two groups of 
countries is consistent with the fact that 
arms producers tend to obtain net positive 
benefits from military expenditures while 
non-producers find their overall rates of 
growth declining with increased allocations 
to defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite an explosion of studies on the impact of 
defense expenditures on developing country growth, no 
clear and simple answer to the question--does defense 
spending have an impact of economic performance --has 
emerged. 
be yes, 
Depending on the researcher, the answer could 
maybe, or no with different degrees of 
confidence. There is also considerable disagreement 
about the nature of this impact, if it exists. 
Suggesting a reciprocal relationship between military 
outlay and economic performance, some analysts feel 
that as current defense spending can affect future 
economic performance, current or expected economic 
conditions can influence governmental decisions about 
how much to spend on defense[1 ]. 
As Chan(2] noted, we need to decompose the research 
problems in this area into separate questions and ask: 
(1) what kind of impact (2) how does this this impact 
occur ( 3) what are the relevant measures of defense 
burden and the relevant measures of economic 
performance (4) when is this impact more likely to be 
likely to felt (5) which countries are more 
experience this impact 
costs of this impact 
( 6) what are the opportunity 
(7) which domestic groups and 
areas are more likely to benefit or to be hurt by this 
impact and (8) what are the policy implications of this 
impact. 
The purpose of this paper is to make a first attempt 
at answering several of these questions by integrating 
two major areas of research the defense growth 
debate and the defense budgetary tradeoffs debate 
that despite their rather obvious connection have 
been undertaken quite independently from one another. 
More specifically the analysis below shows that: 
1. When examining Third World countries as sub sets 
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a domestic arms industry, one finds sharply 
diverging results as to the impact of the 
military burden on growth. 
2. The budgetary tradeoffs between defense and non-
defense expenditures differ considerably 
depending on whether a country is an arms 
producer or not. 
3. Differences in the budgetary process in arms 
producing and non-arms producing countries are 
likely to account in part for the contrasting 
impact that increased military burdens have with 
respect to each group of countries. 
The main contribution of the analysis below to the 
ongoing defense growth debate is the identification of 
a clear and unambiguous mechanism leading from changes 
in the burden to variations in overall 
economic 
military 
growth. Previously, linkages from the 
military burden to growth have been alluded to by 
various researchers, but none have been quantitatively 
identified. 
PREVIOUS ANALYSIS 
There are many hypotheses one can develop about the 
manner in which increased defense spending may affect 
growth favorably or unfavorably. Rothchild(3], 
Benoit[4], Deger and Sen[SJ, Frederiksen and Looney[6), 
Looney[?], Faini, Annez and Taylor[8), Leontief and 
Duchinl 9), Lim[ 1 O), Deger and Smith[ 11), Bis was and 
Ram[12), have advanced a variety of arguments. 
Despite the diversity in their approaches and 
a·rguments, 
important 
most researchers probably recognize two 
mechanisms through which militarY 
expenditures may affect economic growth[13): 
1. the military sector may for a variety of reasons 
generate positive or negative externalities for 
the rest of the economy; and 
2. there may be important factor productivitY 
differences between the two sectors. 
In his seminal work, Benoit[14), after controlling 
for the effects of investment and bilateral economic 
assistance, found (for the period 1960-65) a positive 
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and significant relationship between the defense burden 
(defense expenditures share 
and the growth in civilian 
in gross national product) 
GMP. On the other hand, 
over the 1950-65 period he did not find a statistically 
significant relationship 
and growth. 
between the defense burden 
In Benoit's view, the positive correlation in the 
shorter time period indicated that military 
expenditures were more likely to be the cause rather 
than the effect of faster economic growth. His actual 
conclusions, however, were stated in rather cautious 
and tentative terms[15]: 
We have been unable to establish whether the 
net growth effects of defense expenditures 
have been positive or not. On the basis of 
all the evidence we suspect that they have 
been positive but we have not been able 
to prove this. Heavy defense expenditure 
does not, however, appear to have been 
associated with lower growth rates, even 
after adjusting for differences in foreign 
aid receipts and investment rates and this in 
itself is surprising. 
The positive relationship found by Benoit between 
the defense burden and economic growth could, however, 
be spurious because economic growth could be caused by 
the inflow of other types of foreign resources not just 
aid. There has also been considerable skepticism 
regarding Benoit's explanation that rising military 
expenditures stimulate private demand and encourage 
fuller utilization of production facilities. Several 
critics have argued that the main problem facing 
developing countries is not inadequate demand and 
underutilized capacity, but severe production 
bottlenecks in precisely those industrial sectors that 
are likely to be further strained to cope with 
additional defense demands. Finally, several analysts 
h.ave objected to Benoit's structural specification of 
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the analytic model linking defense expenditures to 
growth and his 
his model[16]. 
measure of the defense burden used in 
Although the studies that attempt to verify Benoit's 
results do not always agree among themselves, they have 
not, on the whole, supported his conclusion. Some 
failed to find any strong and systematic relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth in the 
Third World. Others actually discovered a significant 
negative relationship between these variables, either 
for developing countries as a whole, or at least for 
some subsets of countries. While some analysts found a 
positive relationship for several countries, such as 
the OPEC countries, or a somewhat even larger group of 
unconstrained countries[17], this phenomenon appears 
more the exception than the rule. Mone of the 
validating studies would support Benoit's observation 
that the positive impact of military expenditures on 
growth is a widespread phenomenon among developing 
countries. On the other hand, the evidence in support 
of a negative relationship between defense spending 
and economic growth has usually produced modest (albeit 
statistically significant) tradeoff and sometimes is 
derived from very small samples of subsets of the 
developing countries[18]. 
As noted above, the major deficiency common to most 
of these studies is their omission, except in a very 
general sort of way of the specification of a mechanism 
through which military burdens impact on growth. 
Benoit's resort to Keynesian demand creation effects 
for n~t positive impacts and Frederiksen and Looney's 






appropriation of scarce 
military, remain as the 
the observed impacts of 





Completely isolated from the defense growth debate, 
a number of researchers have been simultaneously 
attempting to determine whether increases in defense 
expenditures in Third World public sector budgets 
systematically 
allocations. 
displace various socioeconomic 





have concentrated almost exclusively on the 
developed countries; 
have proceeded from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives; 
have employed an array of methodological 
approaches; and 
have produced conflicting and mixed results. 
Peroff and Warren[21 I conclude that "the number of 
studies which indicates the existence of a tradeoff 
approximates 
exists."[22] 
the number that shows that none 
While 
tradeoffs 
the bulk of the research on budgetary 
between defense and social program 
expenditures has focused on the industrial countries of 
North America and Western Europe, Hayes[23], has 
suggested that the problem Of tradeof f s between 
defense spending and social investments "is perhaps 
even more serious in the developing countries."[24] 
In a major United Nations report the Secretary 
General argued that when the needs of economic 
development are so pressing in the developing 
countries, it is 
The 
a disturbing thought that these countries 
have found it necessary to increasing 
military spending so speedily, particularly 
when their per capita income is so low." 
Study concluded that military expenditures 







to make a considerable 
the level of investment 
and in the volume of 
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resources which can be devoted 




The clear implication of this United Nations report 
is that increased defense spending may have negative 
consequences for socioeconomic development programs 
such as health, education, and economic services. 
Clearly, the basic criticism leveled against defense 
expenditures is that they reduce the total resources 
available for economic development programs such as 
health, education, and economic services. 
Therefore, the basic and rather obvious criticism 
leveled against defense expenditures is the usual guns 
vs butter dichotomy i.e. , that increases in defense 
expenditures reduce the total resources available for 
economic and social development. The growing need on 
the part of developing countries for both domestic and 
foreign resources could be met, it is argued,by freeing 
some of the current allocations for defense.especially 
where economic difficulties demand major structural 
adjustments. Critics of defense expenditures argue 
that allocations in this area complicate the task of 
adjustment, since they escape analysis and scrutiny 
while using up high opportunity resources[26]. 
While this argument appears sound in a zero-sum 
world, in actuality these fears are somewhat 
surprisingly not always borne out. For example, in her 
analysis of 
variety of 
budgetary allocations to 
socioeconomic programs in 
Hayes [ 27 I concluded 
defense and a 
Brazil between 
that military 1950 and 
spending 
1967, 
did not necessarily yield negative 
consequences for social and economic investments. She 
found that substitutions between military allocations 
and allocations to other sectors do occur frequently• 
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but that the burden Of these substitutions is 
distributed across all categories at one time or 
another. Further she judged that when they do occur, 
these substitutions are not severe. Finally she 
determined that Cat least in the Brazilian case) a 
zero-sum situation did not always occur between defense 
and non defense allocations in the sense that defense 
spending was often accompanied by substantial increases 
in spending for infrastructure and other development 
related activities as the central government expanded 
its overall level of expenditures. 
She did find on the other hand that increased 
defense spending has some negative effects on social 
spending, but that this "was mild because social 
investment was not a major priorit-y- of any of the 
regimes examined."(28) Nevertheless, Hayes reported a 
correlation of -0.23 between defense and social 
development (education, health, welfare) expenditures 
measured as percentages of the total public budget. In 
addition she found a -0.28 correlation between 
spending on military personnel and social development 
expenditures. Although "theoretical generalizations 
cannot be made and hypotheses cannot be accepted o:r 
:rejected on the basis of evidence from a single 
case," [ 29 I Hayes :research seems to indicate at most 
some potential competition between military 
expenditures and socio economic budgetary allocations. 
Even more su:rp:rising Cand counter-intuitive) was 
the finding of Ames and Goff [ 30 I (using pooled c:ross-
section series data for 18 Latin American countries fo:r 
the period 1948-1968) that education and defense 
spending tend to increase and decrease simultaneously. 
Co:r:relating defense and education spending in absolute 
terms, as percentage changes from year to year and 
relative total budget and gross domestic product fo:r 
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individual years C and :regimes), Ames and Goff found 
:rather high positive correlations between defense and 
education expenditures measured relative to the total 
budget. Mindful of serious auto-co:r:relation problems 
in their analysis, Ames and Goff concluded that 
although other (presumably unidentifiable) policy areas 
may lose out in the budgetary process, neither 
education no:r defense "gains at the expense of the 
othe :r. " [ 31 I 
In summary, as in the defense/growth debate, there 
is conflicting evidence about the interaction of 
defense with other growth inducing variables [ 32). In 
the following analysis an attempt is made to build upon 
the studies summarized above, and to specify more 
precisely the extent, direction and form of the 
defense/socioeconomic spending t:radeoffs in Third World 
countries. More importantly, an attempt is made to 
demonstrate that these observed budgetary t:radeoffs a:re 
quite consistent with the impact that defense 
expenditures apparently have on overall economic 
growth. More precisely if we find that allocations to 
agriculture a:re systematically :reduced during periods 
of increased defense expenditures, we might anticipate 
a series of events food shortages, increased 
imports, increased cost of :raw materials, depressed 
demand fo:r non-ag:ricultu:ral products, and so on. The 
net effect of this sequence would most likely be 
:reduced :rates of overall growth. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Starting with a simple Benoit type framework, the 
impact of the military burden Chere defined as the 
average level of military expenditures per capita over 
the 1970-81 period) on overall economic growth[33) 
CGDPGB) fo:r the period 1970-82 was first examined. 
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Benoit's basic equation was expanded somewhat to 
take into 
studies as 
account factors identified in subsequent 






These variables included: 
The capital output ratio CICOR), here defined as 
the ?rowth in GDP 1970-81 divided by the growth 
in investment over the same period. Lim[ 34] 
found this variable to be particularly useful in 
his defense growth analysis. 
The growth of investment CGDIGB) over 
1970-82 period. Empirically this variable 
results superior to Benoit's measure 




The inflation rate over the 1970-82 period 
CIHFB) was included to control for the possible 
effect increases in the defense burden may have 
on price increases Cand of course the subsequent 
impact of inflation on growth. Deger and 
Smith's recent study appears to indicate that 
some inflationary pressures may stem from 
increases in the defense burden[35]. 
The external public debt accumulated by the end 
of the time period ( 1982). This variable 
replaces Benoit's foreign aid and reflects more 
accurately the nature of capital flows to Third 
World countries in the 1970s and early 
1980s[36]. The variable used to proxy the 
effective external public debt was debt service 
to export ratio in 1982 CDSEB). 
A balance of payments constraint proxied by 
the average resource balance CRBB) over the 
1970-82 period was included to control for the 
OPEC type countries whose surpluses on current 
account might offset any negative impact the 
defense burden might have J!.lti. ~ on growth; and 
finally; 
BUDGETARY IMPACTS OF THIRD WORLD ARMS PRODUCTION 611 
5. The average budgetary surplus or deficit CGDB) 
as a percent of gdp over the 1970-82 period. 
This variable was included to control for the 
dampening impact austerity programs might have 
had on growth over and above that associated 
with increases in the military burden. 
For the total sample= 
GDPGB = 0.83 GDIGB - 0.03 MEP - 0.14 IHFB 
(7.69) (-0.33) (-1.48) 
+ 0.19 RBB - 0.26 GDB 
(1.65) (-2.34) 
r2 = 0.621; F = 15.13; DF = 51 
Real GDP growth over the 1970-82 period was found to 
be largely a function of the rate of real growth in 
investment over the same time period Cthe regression 
coefficients are standardized estimates) and the extent 
to which the government was running budgetary deficits 
during this period (a negative sign on the government 
deficit term -- GDB indicates that increased deficits 
had a stimulating effect on overall growth). 
Surprisingly, the military burden CMEP) was 
insignificant when included in the regression equation. 
There may, however, be variations in the budgetary 
patterns in different groups of Third World countries. 
In particular it is logical to expect that the 
budgetary compositions and tradeoffs between defense 
expenditures and non-defense items might vary somewhat 
depending on whether the Third World country was an 
arms producer or not[37]. 
Clearly, the possession of a domestic arms industry 
will undoubtedly reduce budget flexibility in most 
developing countries. For example, it maY be fairly 
easy for a non-arms producing country to cancel an 
international arms purchase during periods of economic 
austerity, but difficult for arms producers to close 
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down a local defense plant under the same economic 
conditions[38J. 
Whether or not there is any systematic bias in the 
way arms and non-arms producers determine their defense 
non-defense budgetary tradeoffs may ultimately account 
for the impact defense expenditures have on overall 
growth in their respective economies. More 
specifically, do arms producers or their non-producer 
counterparts significantly and systematically reduce 
growth inducing budgetary allocations to accommodate 
increased military burdens. 
Using the model estimated abou.e for the total 
sample of countries, the impact of increased military 
burdens on growth in the producing and non producing 
countries was estimated for each individual group of 
countries. 
For the non-arms producers(39]: 
(b) GDPGB = 1.10 GDIGB - 0.63 MEP + 0.24 DSEB 
(9.23) (-5.35) (2.24) 
r 2 0.802; F = 28.50; DF 35 
For the producing countries: 
Cc) GDPGB = 0.76 GDIGB + 0.84 MEP - 0.60 IMFB 
(4.35) (3. 14) (-2.94) 
+ 0.38 RBB + 0.60 ICOR 
(2.80) (2.33) 
r2 = 0.802; F = 11.35; DF = 19 
There are sharp contrasts between producer and non-
producer countries with regard to the impact of 




and The arms producers show a highly significant 
positive impact on the military burden 
growth, with external debt playing 





On the other hand countries not possessing 
indigenous arms industry relied largely 








impact on growth. 
there a significant 
in an environment 
burdens had a high 




patterns of arms producers and non-producers with 
regard to the tradeoffs in non-defense allocations that 
might account for the contrasting impacts of the 
military burden on growth. 
Budgetary tradeoffs were examined by constructing a 
simple model of the form: share Cx) = share (defense) + 
control variable. Where share Cx(40]) is the share of 
a non-defense category in the government's budget. 
Control variables were used to improve the 
specification of the regression model, thus obtaining 
less biased estimates. Three control variables were 
selected (a) public consumption share of GDP in 
1981, (b) government expenditure share of GDP in 1981, 
and (c) the public external debt as a percent of GDP 
in 1 981 I 41 I . 
For the total sample of countries (arms producers 
and non-producers) it appears (Table 1) that increased 
defense expenditures occur largely at the expense of 
allocations for total economic services, especially 
agriculture, and possibly other purposes. 
Surprisingly, a large number of budgetary items are 
complementary with defense (i.e. have positive signs in 
the regression equations). In fact, general public 
services, education, 





community activities all increase or decrease with the 
share of defense expenditures in the budget. 
for the non-arms producers, much the same picture 
(Table 2) emerges. In general, however, the 
correlations between defense and non-defense items are 
considerably higher than those obtained for the total 
sample. Economic services, agriculture, and other 
TABLE 1 
BUDGETARY IMPACT OF DEFENSF EXPFNDITURES: TOTAL 5AMPLE 
(standarized coefficients.) 
Independent Variable 
Pl.bl ic Government Pl.bl ic 
Share Consumption Expenditure External 
Budgetary category 
lfeneral Plbl, c Servf ces 
of Share of Share of Debt Statistics 
Defense GDP GDP Burden r2 F --OW 
. . 
Education (5.91) (-1.94) 0.475 19.95 46 0.51 -0.09 
Heal th 
Social Security 
Housing & Community Activities 
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0.256 8.27 50 
0.281 9.39 50 
0.006 0.13 50 
0.133 3.93 53 
0.371 14.17 50 
0.224 7.37 53 
0.215 6.58 50 
0.365 12.35 45 
0.289 9.74 50 
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purposes. and perhaps housing and community activities 
are cut by governments in the non-producing countries 
to accommodate increased shares of the budget allocated 
to defense. For this group (and in contrast to the 
total group of Third World countries) social security 
expenditures move in line with changes in the share of 
the budget allocated to defense. 
As with the case of the defense/growth relationship, 
the arms producers show (Table 3) a sharply different 
pattern of budgetary tradeoffs. For this group of 
countries, only agriculture is significantly cut when 
the share of defense expenditures is expanded. In 
fact, no real clear pattern of tradeoffs exists for 
this group, with only general public services, other 
community 
defense . 
activities and roads 
CONCLUSIONS 
complementary to 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, little 
integration has taken place between the body of 
analysis focussed on the defense/growth issue, and that 
dealing with defense, non-defense budgetary tradeoffs. 
In part, one reason for the limited amount of research 
devoted to these issues probably stems from the fact 
that analysts examining large samples of developing 
countries are unlikely to find any particularly 
interesting linkages between defense and growth or 
between defense and non-defense budgetary categories. 
The results presented above confirm that for Third 
World countries as a whole the military burden does not 
appear to have a statistically significant impact on 
growth. In a similar manner. Third World countries as 
a group tend to have a pattern of budgetary tradeoffs 
between defense and non-defense items that in the net 
are unlikely to affect overall growth one way or 
another. For these countries, increases in the share 
618 LOONEY 
of the budget going to defense are also associated with 
increases in education, health, roads and other 
transport and communication items all likely to 
enhance growth. The corresponding reduction in the 
share of resources allocated to economic activities and 
agriculture, most likely reduces output with the net 
result that the overall impact of increased defense 
allocations on growth is neutral. 
Non-arms producers, however, tend to cut a 
disproportionate number of growth enhancing allocations 
to accommodate expansions in the military budget. The 
net impact is one of increased military spending 
impacting negatively on growth. 
In contrast, the arms producers as a group have 
tended to avoid sharp cuts in growth enhancing 
expenditures Cwith the exception of agriculture). The 
multiplier linkages between increases in the defense 
burden and the private sector must, in the aggregate, 
be sufficient to produce the observed increases in 
aggregate 
countries. 
growth experienced by 
Clearly, the mere possession of 
industry places some constraint 
this group of 
a domestic arms 
on 
process in arms producing countries 
the budgetary 
that is not 
The nature of 
likely not be 
present in non-arms producing countries. 
this constraint will, however, most 
understood with any degree of certainty until after a 
number of detailed country studies are completed. 
REFERENCES 
Ill These studies, their assumptions, results, and 
limitations are all excellently surveyed by Steve 
Chan in his "The Impact of Defense Spending on 
Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and 
Problems," Orbis (Summer 1985), vol.29, pp. 
403-434. 
BUDGETARY IMPACTS OF THIRD WORLD ARMS PRODUCTION 619 
[2] Ibid, p. 410. 
[ 3] Kurt W. Rothchild, 
and Growth," Kyklos, 
pp. 804-13. 
"Military Expenditure, Exports 
(December 1977), volume xxvi 
[ 4] Emile Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing 
countries," Economic Development and Cultural 
Change (January 1978), vol. 26 pp. 271-80. 
(5] Saadet Deger and s. Sen, Military Expenditure, 
Spin-Off and Economic Development," Journal of 
Development Economics (August-October 1983), vol 13 
pp. 67-83. 
(6) P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. Looney, "Defense 
Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence," 
Journal of Economic Development (July 1982), vol. 7 
pp. 113-26; P. C Frederiksen and R. E. Looney, 
"Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries," Armed Forces and Society 
(Summer 1983), vol. 9 pp. 633-45; P.C. Frederiksen 
and R.E. Looney, "Another Look at the Defense 
Spending and Development Hypothesis," Defense 
Analys il2. C September 1985), vol. 11 pp. 2 0 5-21 0; and 
Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "Defense 
Expenditures, External Public Debt, and Growth in 
Developing Countries," Journal of Peace Research 
(December 1986), pp. vol. 23 329-338; 
[ 7] Robert E. Looney, "The Economic Impact of Rent 
Seeking and Military Expenditures in Third World 
Military and Civilian Regimes," American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology (1988 forthcoming). 
[8) R. Faini, P. Annez and L. Taylor, "Defense 
Growth," Evidence Spending, Economic Structure and 
Among Countries and Over 
Development and Cultural Change 





[9) W. Leontief and Faye Duchin, Military Spending: 
Facts and Figures, World Wide Implications and 
Future Outlook (Hew York: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
[10] David Lim, "Another Look at Growth and Defense in 
Less Developed Countries," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change (January 1983), vol. 31 pp. 
377-84. 
(11 I Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure 
and Development: The Economic Linkages," 1J!..§. 
Bulletin (October 1985 l, vol. 16 pp. 49-54. 
620 LOONEY 
[ 12 1 Basudeb Bis was and Rati Ram, "Military 
Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed 
Countries: An Augmented Model and Further 
Evidence," Economic Development .an.9. Cultural 
Change (January 1986), vol. 34 pp. 361-372. 
(13] Ibid., p.362. 
(141 E. Benoit, Defense 
Developing Countries 
Books, 1983), p. 3. 
.an.9. Economic Growth .in 
(Lexington, Mass: Lexington 
I 15 I .IJLl...ll. 
I 16 I Chan, .Q..R. cit., p. 412 . 
I 17 I See the work of Frederiksen and Looney cited 
above. 
[ 18] Ibid., pp.412-413. 
(19] See also the spin-off linkag~s argument developed 
by Deger and Sen .Q..R. cit. 
(20] Joel Verner, "Budgetary Trade-offs Between 
Research 
(October 
Education and Defense in Latin America: A 
Note" The Journal of Developing Areas 
1983), vol. 18 p.78. 
(21 I Kathleen Peroff and Margaret Podolak-Warren, "Does 
Spending on Defense Cut Spending on Health: A Time 
Series Analysis of the U.S. Economy, 1929- 74," 
British Journal of Political Science (January 
1979), vol. 9 p. 22. 
(22] Ibid., p. 49. 
(23] Margaret D. Hayes, "Policy Consequences of 
Military Participation in Politics: An analysis of 
Tradeoffs in Brazilian Federal Expenditures," in 
Craig Liske, William Loehr and J. MckCamatt, eds., 
Comparative Public Policy (Hew York: John Wiley, 
1976), pp. 21-52. 
(24] Ibid., p. 23. 
(25] United Nations, Secretary General, Economic and 
Social Consequences of the ~ Race and Military 
Expenditures (United Nations Document Ho. 
A/8469/Rev, 1971), pp. 19-29. 
I 26 I Shuja Hawaz, 
Expenditures," 
1983)' vol. 20 
[ 27 1 .Q..R. .Q...i.!. . 
(28] ll..il!. p. 50. 
I 29 I .il...il. 
Economic Impact of Defense 
Finance .an.9. Development (March 
pp. 34-35. 
BUDGETARY IMPACTS OF THIRD WORLD ARMS PRODUCTION 621 
[ 30 I Barry Ames and Ed Goff, "Education and Defense 
Expenditures in Latin America: 1948-1965," in 
Craig Liske tl.A.].., .Q..R . .s<...i.i., pp. 175-198. 
(31] .I..!2..'b..\i. pp. 179-80. 
I 32 I 
[ 33] 
For a recent, detailed survey of the other major 
studies in this area Cf. Joel Vener, .Q..R. cit., 
pp. 77-91 . 
Economic data is from the World Bank, World 
Development Report, (Hew York: Oxford University 
Press, various issues). Military expenditure data 
is from United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers, CWashington,D.C: ACDA,various issues). 
(34] Lim, .Q..R. cit. 
[ 35 I Deger and Smith, .ll· 
"Military Expenditures 
Developed Countries," 
Resolution(1984), vol. 28 
cit. See also their 
and Growth in Less 
Journal .Q.i. Conflict 
pp. 335-53. 
[ 36 I Cf. Robert E. Looney and P. C. Frederiksen, 
"Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt and 
Growth in Developing Countries," Jouinal of Peace 
Research, .Q..R. cit. 
[ 37 I Cf. Robert Looney and P. C. Frederiksen, "Profiles 
of Current Latin American Arms Producers," 
International Organization (Summer 1986), vol. 40 
PP. 345-352. Here and in the present study arms 
producers are determined on the basis of whether a 
major weapons system is produced domestically. 
See Stephanie Heuman, "International 
Stratification and Third World Military 
Industries," International Organization <Winter 
1984), vol. 38 pp. 167-97 for a listing of the 
producers and their weapons production. 
[38] David K. Whynes, The Economics of Third World 
Military Expenditures (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1979), pp. 26-30. 
(39] Only the statistically significant results are 
presented here. 
[ 40 I Budgetary data were taken from the International 
Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund) and are for the year 1981. 
[41 I For each budgetary item, the control variable with 
the highest t statistic was selected for the 
results presented in Tables 1,2 and 3. 
